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The Precedent of Kosovo – Law and 
Politics 
 
Matej Hamran 
 
 Introduction 
 
It has been two years since the Assembly of Kosovo declared 
independence without any bilateral agreement with Serbia. The proclaimed 
Kosovo Statehood raises multiple issues of the relationship between law, 
facts and politics on the international plane. The Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence
41
 on 17 February 2008 initiated further dispute about the 
significance of the principles and real authority of international law.  
Kosovo, a small country in South Eastern Europe, finds itself at the 
centre of geo-political interests of the world’s major states competing for 
influence in the Balkans, undoubtedly an area with strategic significance. 
As a consequence of the substantial political interest in this matter, the 
legal reasoning asserting secession of Kosovo is highly ambiguous and 
                                                
41   UDI. 
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varies according to the political claims of particular parties involved. The 
primary aim of this article is to present a relevant and purely legal 
argument in regard to the question of the legality of the creation of a 
Statehood of Kosovo and whether there has been established a legal 
precedent suitable for other secessionist claims elsewhere, or whether it is 
a singular case in its own right - sui generis. In order to reach an 
acceptable conclusion it is crucial to clearly distinguish between the legal 
argumentation and any political matters which may interfere.  
As an introduction to the dispute it is necessary to briefly 
acknowledge several historical and social factors evolving into the current 
situation in Kosovo. There is a common practice of misinterpretation of 
history in order to support the political stands of the parties involved; 
therefore; the summarisation has to be made in a politically accurate way 
with no preference given to any of them. Arguments based on incorrect 
utilisation of the historical facts in order to support the legitimate claim 
lose their reliability. The conflict in Kosovo is long and complicated; there 
is no simple black or white, good or bad. Some issues have to be taken 
sensitively, owing to the large number of victims involved.   
Kosovo is nowadays populated 90 per cent by Albanians and seven 
per cent by Serbians, while and the rest of its inhabitants comprise other 
37 
 
ethnic groups, including Roma, Bosniaks or Gorani. The structure of 
Kosovo’s population has been changing over the decades and no ethnic 
group has ever made it easy for the others to co-exist.  
The legal framework for the constitutional parts of the former multi-
ethnic SFRY
42
 has been established by the 1974 Constitution as a result of 
a long-lasting process of establishment of a federal system which would 
uniformly divide the country so no ethnicity would feel unequal or left out 
in the sphere of the government. Six Republic units
43
 and two Autonomous 
provinces were confirmed. Within the Republic of Serbia there were 
constituted the Autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo44 with 
dual status, becoming de facto federal constitutional Republics as the other 
units.
45
   
The period of the 1980s was influenced by the rise of Serbian 
nationalism, the major ethnicity of the former Yugoslavia. Under the 
regime of Slobodan Milosevic Serbia gained dominance in the Federal 
government, which was the downfall of the cautious balance created by 
the 1974 Constitution. As a consequence, in 1989 Kosovo suffered the 
                                                
42
   Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1943-1992). 
 
43   Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia. In spite of this, a new 
nationality was created - Bosniaks (Muslim Serbo-Croatian speakers). 
 
44   In Serbian terminology = Kosovo i Metohija, in Albanian= Kosova, in English= Kosovo.  
 
45   Müllerson. R. op. cit. p.127. 
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abolition of its previous status; simultaneously, with the claims of the 
other constitutional republics seeking independence, the tensed 
atmosphere blurred into tragic civil war, the “final nail into the coffin” of 
the Federation remaining united.  
During the 1990s the Albanian minority in Kosovo became less 
tranquil and the oppression of the Central Government resulted in 
increased violence and threats. According to the conditions determined in 
Rambouillet,46 Yugoslavia should loosen control over Kosovo47 and 
provide Albanians with self-governance, where the eventual chance for 
secession arose. Later the actions of the illegal Kosovo Liberation Army
48
 
led to a gradual loss of control over Kosovo by the Yugoslav Central 
Government.  The Yugoslav Army reacted with a rampage through 
Kosovo, which resulted in approximately a million refugees in a region of 
a population of around two million. In 1999, the Yugoslav attack was 
followed by the no-UNSC
49
-approved 78-day NATO air campaign against 
                                                
46   1999 Rambouillet Accords - proposed agreement between Yugoslavia and Kosovo Albanian minority drafted 
by NATO. 
 
47   It should be also borne in mind, not only the loss of a territory, but also the special value of Kosovo for Serbs 
as the crib of Serbian culture and religion. Andrew Bell-Fialkoff used a zinger comparison to show the 
importance of Kosovo to Serbs. To lose Kosovo would be to “leave out Orleans from the History of France, or 
Oxford from the History of England, however not quite completely, since Kosovo is sacral for Serbs, unlike 
from Orleans or Oxford”. 
 
48   Kosovo Liberation Army – KLA (UÇK- Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës). 
49   United Nations Security Council. 
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the FRY
50
 which forced the Yugoslav Army to withdraw from the territory 
of Kosovo.   
Since that time Kosovo has been under the patronage of the 
UNMIK,
51
 according to the UNSC Resolution 1244 which emphasised, 
and was implemented under the condition of, respecting the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the FRY. The UNMIK intended to keep the 
situation in Kosovo peaceful, but even so several inter-ethnic 
confrontations occurred. The UN attempted to re-establish the status quo 
in the province by the UN Special Envoy Comprehensive Proposal for 
Kosovo Status Settlement
52
 which introduced the doctrine of “supervised 
independence”, essentially constituting a formal loss of Serbia’s 
sovereignty in Kosovo. The UNSC refused the doctrine, since Russia, as 
the permanent member of the UNSC, used the veto privilege.  
On 16 February 2008, the day before the actual declaration of 
independence, the EU deployed an Administration Mission called 
EULEX
53
 to Kosovo, operating within the framework of the UNMIK and 
                                                
50   Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-2003), Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006), Serbia (2006 - 
onward) and Montenegro (2006 – onward). 
 
51  United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (1999 - still operating). 
 
52  Known also as “supervised independence” or Ahtisaari Plan, as proposed by the UN Special Envoy 
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, Martti Ahtisaari. 
 
53   European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. 
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the controversial concept of Supervised Independence refused by the 
UNSC.  This brought the whole concept into legal dispute. The mandate of 
EULEX is to increase the quality of self-governance, rule of law, policy, 
judicial and legislative branches and to support Kosovo in constructing a 
stable administration structure; seeing the aim to stabilise the whole 
region, with the potential for further political and economic development 
in the region. The effort of the EU enabled the Parliament of Kosovo to 
declare independence on the next day, 17 February 2008. 
Serbia, supported by the UNGA Resolution
54
, has requested the 
ICJ
55
 for an Advisory Opinion with the following question: "Is the 
unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?"
56
 Even 
after more than a year the ICJ has still not concluded a final verdict. Serbia 
and Russia believe that the EULEX is illegally maintaining the presence of 
the UNMIK, which was deployed under the provision of territorial 
integrity of Serbia as it was declared during the hearings of the ICJ.
57
 
                                                
54United Nations General Assembly GA/10764 Available: 
http://www.##.org/News/Press/docs/2008/ga10764.htm (20.8.2009). 
 
55   International Court of Justice. 
 
56   ICJ Press Release No. 2009/27 29th of July 2009. 
57   http://www.b92.net/eng/news/in_focus.php?id=91&start=390 (25.3.2010). 
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Nevertheless, declaratory opinions of the ICJ are not binding and, 
therefore, are not enforceable. So, it is unlikely that any decision would 
have any substantial effect on the factual situation although it might bring 
more light to the legal question and affect the process of international 
recognition, and it also may eventually move Kosovo toward legal 
Statehood.  Up to now, Kosovo has been recognised by 65
58
 out of 192 UN 
member states; therefore, the majority of the international community still 
refuses to recognise Kosovo, including several EU member states.  In 
addition, the permanent members of the UNSC, Russia and the People’s 
Republic of China are blocking Kosovo’s membership in the UN.   
 
Legal dispute 
 
 In order to analyse whether Kosovo constitutes a precedent, it must 
be acknowledged first whether Kosovo meets the essential criteria of 
sovereignty drawn by the 1933 Montevideo Convention. Moreover, there 
needs to be consideration of the principles of self-determination of 
peoples, territorial integrity and international recognition. Furthermore, the 
                                                
58   http://www.president-ksgov.net/site/?id=1,67,67,67,e,,, (25.3.2010). 
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principles of jus cogens, as the prohibition of use of force, and also the 
principle of uti possidetis juris59, may effectively be utilised.  
Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties 
of States sets out the most widely accepted formulation of the criteria of 
Statehood in international law. A state should satisfy these qualifications: 
(1) a permanent population, (2) a defined territory, (3) government and (4) 
capacity to enter into relations with other states. During the process of 
legal dissolution of the SFRY
60
, the Arbitration Commission of the 
European Conference on Yugoslavia,
61
 in its Opinion No.1, declared that: 
“the state is commonly defined as a community which consists of a 
territory and population subject to an organised political authority”. The 
state that satisfies these criteria can be characterised as sovereign.
62
 In the 
context of Kosovo, two problematic areas arise: effective government and 
capacity to enter into relations with other states.  
 The requirement of effective government needs attention in light of 
the Kosovo international administration, which consequently limits the 
conduct of a state to sovereignty. For a political society to function 
                                                
59
   Uti possidetis juris - the borders are not to be changed without expressed consent of the concerned states.  
This principle has been reiterated in the case of Yugoslavia in the Opinion No.3 of the YAC.  
 
60   Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1943-1992). 
 
61   Yugoslav Arbitration Commission - YAC. 
 
62   Shaw, M. N., International Law, 6th ed. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2008), p. 198. 
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responsibly and effectively there is a need to form a government or a 
central control; however, this aspect cannot be regarded as a pre-condition 
for recognition as an independent country
63
 although the principle of self-
determination is often set contrary to the concept of effective government, 
particularly in arguments concerning continuation of colonial rule.
64
 
 Kosovo is administrated under the conception of “independence with 
international supervision” intending to provide independent and efficient 
self-governance of the territory, with the stipulation that it is to be subject 
to permanent monitoring by the international community with the presence 
of an International Civilian Representative
65
 appointed by the International 
Steering Group.
66
 The ICR has a final authority regarding interpretation of 
the civilian aspects of the Settlement, particularly the ability to annul 
decisions or laws adopted by the Kosovo authorities and to sanction and 
remove public officials whose actions were determined to be inconsistent 
with the Settlement terms. International military presence led by NATO 
ensures a safe environment throughout Kosovo.
67
  
                                                
63   Ibid., p. 200. 
 
64   I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008), p. 71. 
 
65   ICR in Kosovo. 
 
66   The primary purpose of the International Steering Group (ISG), comprising 26 European states and the USA, 
is to support full implementation of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement of UN 
Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari of 26 March 2007 http://www.ico-kos.org/?id=3 (19.11.2009). 
 
67   Shaw, M. N. op. cit., p. 446. 
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 The practice of international law regarding the criterion of effective 
exercising of control by a government has been modified in relation to the 
creation of the states of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both states were 
recognised as independent and admitted to membership of the UN,
68
 
which, in accordance with Article 4 of the UN Charter, is permitted only to 
states, at a time when both states did not exercise full control over their 
territories and where non-governmental forces controlled substantial areas 
during civil war conditions. On the other hand, Kosovo, two years after its 
declared independence, is not accepted as a member of the UN. However, 
behind these issues are apparent political interests and law may just 
observe it; nevertheless, the conception of supervised independence lies at 
the edge of the doctrine of independence and dependent state.
69
 
The Kosovo government does not provide effective control over the 
Serb-inhabited areas in Northern Kosovo and it is hard to argue how far 
the territory can be effectively controlled without the presence of NATO-
KFOR troops. The EULEX aim is to remain in place until the government 
of Kosovo is capable of self-governance, and of constituting a secure and 
multicultural society. Whether the Kosovans are capable of such 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
68  Both States were admitted on 22 May 1992 http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml (21.11.2009). 
 
69   According to Brownlie, op. cit. p.73, a dependent state can be a “legal person of a special type, appearing on 
the international plane for certain purposes only, as in the case of mandated and trust territories and some 
protectorates.” 
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achievement in the whole territory of Kosovo is questionable; however, it 
is a fact that Serbia does not provide effective control over Kosovo either. 
The lack of effective central control might be balanced by significant 
international recognition, culminating in membership in the UN.
70
 Despite 
this, the Serbian policy in this matter is quite unclear, since during the 
recent regional elections in Kosovo, the Serbian government was 
encouraging the Serb population to ignore the vote. Although it may be 
argued that this might not be the right track, life continues and in order to 
normalise the situation for all the people of Kosovo, there must be an 
effort to build up an effective government, even at the local level. 
 The capacity to enter into relations with other states represents the 
concept of independence, which is essential for a state in question in order 
to be sovereign. The State of Kosovo does operate in this area, although 
the capacity of Kosovo, due to the non-recognition, or merely partial-
recognition by the international community, is rather limited. Even so 
Kosovo has successfully initiated international relations with a number of 
states. Kosovo is also a member of several international organisations and 
UN agencies, including the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank Group, despite the absence of UN membership. Moreover, Kosovo 
                                                
70   Shaw, M. N. op. cit. p. 201. 
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has already participated in several international conferences regarding the 
Balkan regional stability as a sovereign party. However, at the EU-
Western Balkan States Summit in Brdo (Slovenia) on 20 March 2010, 
Serbia refused to attend unless the Kosovo representatives would 
participate as Kosovo-UNMIK according to the still valid UNSC 
Resolution 1244 (1999)
71
, which effectively caused the meeting to fail.
72
 
Another summit in Sarajevo is being planned for this year so we might 
expect further political development soon.  
 Anyhow the concept of international recognition is disputable in 
itself, because the recent practice of states indicates that it has more a 
declaratory, rather than constitutional, meaning. Therefore, it is considered 
merely as an acceptance of an already existing situation and as an act of 
policy rather than as a legal requirement of international law for creation 
of Statehood, even though it certainly affects the ability of a state to be a 
party to international treaties. For the non-recognising states, the state and 
diplomatic agents of Kosovo are not entitled to diplomatic and state 
immunities among other rights and obligations. The division of the 
                                                
71 During the process of application for a final Settlement for Kosovo, the UN representatives considered the 
UNSC Resolution 1244 as no longer  reflecting the current situation, although the proposed settlement was 
refused and the Resolution was not overruled; therefore, it is still valid. 
 
72http://sofiaecho.com/2010/03/17/874723_serbia-kosovo-problem-dogs-brdo-western-balkans-summit 
(25.3.2010). 
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international community ensures the continuation of uncertainty.
73
 A 
majority of the non-recognising states, including Serbia, are awaiting the 
declaratory decision of the ICJ and may reconsider their stand in relation 
to the decision expected in the near future.
74
 At the same time, it needs to 
be noted that most of the recognising states have acknowledged Kosovo 
only under the stipulation of “international supervision and presence of 
international community”.
75
  
 Another substantial and complex issue regarding the creation of a 
new Statehood is the aspect of self-determination of peoples. The right of 
self-determination is divided into the principle of external and internal 
self-determination, where “external” signifies primarily constructing an 
independent state of one’s own, or secession. The “internal” on the other 
hand affects the free organisation of state order and recognises the ethnic 
minority within the population by providing all necessary rights and duties 
to develop their culture and prosperity.  
                                                
73   Shaw, M. N. op. cit., p. 453. 
 
74   The EU non-recognising countries are Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia. According to the 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 333/2002 of 18 February 2002, holders of a Passport of the Republic of Kosovo 
would be granted a terminated visa in order to enter these countries. The Slovak Republic recognises documents 
of the UNMIK as legal documents in order to enter the Republic. The Slovak Republic does not recognise 
unilateral declaration of the Independence of Kosovo. The Slovak Republic supported an agreement under the 
patronage of UNSC, in order to come to a solution in question. (Source: Centre of Public Relations of Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Slovak Republic).    
 
75   Warbrick, C., “Kosovo: the Declaration of Independence”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 
2008, 57(3), p. 684. 
48 
 
The concept of self-determination arose during the process of 
decolonisation in order to provide a legal instrument for nations under the 
colonial rule to gain independence. It is one of the essential criteria of 
Statehood; however, nowadays the right of self-determination has to be 
considered as an issue outside any colonial context, since the main process 
of decolonisation was already completed and overruled in the 1960s.
76
 
Accordingly, the right of self-determination under its original meaning is 
not legally relevant to the case of Kosovo, as well as the fact that 
according to the 1960 Colonial Declaration
77
 colonised territory should be 
“geographically separated”
78
 and “distinct ethnically and/or culturally 
from the country administering it”. The geographical criterion does not 
apply, and according to the Constitution of Serbia, Kosovo is an integral 
part of the territory, hence not a colony or Non Self-Governing Territory.
79
 
Therefore, beyond the context of decolonisation, it has been established 
                                                
76
   It is claimed that the self-determination context may be used merely in relevance to the events in the 1960s, 
although it is argued that some features of decolonisation were present at the process of the USSR’s dissolution 
in the 1990s, due to the imperial occupation of several territories during the time of the Russian Empire and the 
USSR. Nevertheless, this concept is not suitable for the case of dissolution of Yugoslavia or the secession of 
Kosovo. 
 
77   1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Countries and Peoples. 
 
78   Or so called “sea water” colonisation is used by Prof. Oliver Corten regarding the principle of self-
determination of Kosovars http://de-construct.net/e-zine/?p=2854 (20.11.2009). 
 
79   Monteux, C. A., The Status of Kosovo under International Law (University of London, 15 September 2000), 
p. 28. 
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that external self-determination has obtained legal relevance under the 
human rights regime
80
.   
 Beyond the context of decolonisation, self-determination may be 
argued as a human right to which all individuals are entitled; however, 
some individuals (solely “people”) are denied its enjoyment. It has not 
been explicitly established whether “people” means the entire people of a 
state or whether it means all persons comprising distinctive groupings on 
the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or other.
81
 Therefore, it has to be 
considered whether the Kosovo Albanians are entitled to be “people”. On 
an anthropological and historical basis, Albanians from Albania and 
Kosovo are of the same ethnicity. Both inhabited Kosovo centuries ago as 
religious and linguistic groups distinguishable from the Slavic population 
or other ethnicities. One may use the argument that in the year 1912, the 
Albanian people were split between Albania, Montenegro and Serbia. It 
may be therefore asserted that the Albanian nation as a “people” has been 
granted a territory within the defined borders of the state of Albania as an 
expression of its external self-determination. As a result, the state of 
Albania became the international legal representation of the Albanian 
                                                
80   Ibid., p. 13. 
 
81 Kumbaro, D., The Kosovo Crisis in an International Law Perspective: Self-Determination, Territorial 
Integrity and the NATO Intervention – Final Report (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2001), p. 24. 
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people. Being outside the borders of that state, Kosovo Albanians are 
therefore outside the legal realm of the Albanian people with regards to the 
principle of uti possidetis. Consequently, Kosovo Albanians are regarded 
as a “minority” and were granted extensional minority rights relevant to 
the internal self-determination within their autonomous province, 
according to the 1974 Constitution; although later they were abused by 
Miloseviü by the withdrawing of their constitutional status and by other 
means of violation of the principle of internal self-determination. 
To remain consistent with the rather restrictive theory of “people” as 
a “nation”, Kosovo Albanians should be considered as a “minority” or as 
an “Albanian ethnic enclave”. Therefore, they are not entitled to an 
external right of self-determination in this context. This doctrine might be 
redefined in the future, whether the definition of people represents a 
“complete ethnic nation” or a “homogenous ethnic enclave” within 
another nation.
82
 A shift may also occur in terms of strengthening the right 
to secession in favour of minorities; nevertheless, at this point, the 
definition is explicit. This analysis also shows the position of Kosovo 
Albanians within the former federation of Yugoslavia, where a minority 
                                                
82   Borgen, C. I., “Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination, Secession and Recognition”, 
American Society of International Law, February 2008, pp.1-5 [online] Available: 
http://www.asil.org/insights080229.cfm#author (25.10.2009). 
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was entitled to internal self-determination, although not secession, as, for 
example, Slovenes or Croats. Such an analogy was also followed during 
the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia, although at that time it was 
politically motivated in order not to trigger off more secessionist claims of 
ethnical minorities such as Serbs in Bosnia and others.  
Regarding Kosovo Albanians, as a minority, they might seek legal 
claim to unilateral secession under the concept of “the most extreme of 
cases and carefully defined circumstances”
83
, as well as under the term of 
inadequate use of force by a territorial sovereign. This argument justifies 
Kosovo Albanians as an ethnical minority seeking their independence. It 
may be argued that such a use of force may inhibit the ethnic group from 
re-integrating into the majority population of a state. Nevertheless, it is 
disputable for several reasons. It is a fact that during the war in Kosovo, 
the Yugoslav army used force with inadequate power against the rebellion 
in the province, and there was a serious attempt at ethnic cleansing; 
although, at the time of the proclaimed independence of Kosovo, Serbia 
has not had armed forces in the region for almost 10 years. So it might be 
argued that such secession has a retroactive effect. Additionally, at the 
time of the humanitarian intervention, human rights were being violated by 
                                                
83   Canadian Supreme Court in Re Secession of Quebec (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 385, 438. 
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the KLA, which must not be considered as an excuse for either though.
84
 
The entire population of Kosovo suffered grievously, and victimisation of 
one ethnic group over the others, and subsequent related consequences are 
not observed as correct and appropriate in these particular circumstances.
85
 
Consequently, these doubts in relation to the right of secession under the 
human rights regime make the situation unclear and incapable of 
constituting any persistent legal claim. At this stage, it is assumed that the 
optimal way to deal with the claim of secession, outside of colonial 
concept, is within the frame of the particular situation together with the 
aspects of effective control and international recognition
86
; however, as 
already mentioned these aspects are not sufficiently unambiguous to attach 
legal outcomes to them. 
 On the other hand, there are several other arguments supporting the 
right of secession for Kosovo Albanians. One may see Kosovo as the final 
step of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, although this argument does not 
have any legal validity either.  In 1992 the YAC Opinion No. 8 established 
that the dissolution of Yugoslavia was complete; literally the SFRY 
                                                
84   “The KLA were not much better than the Serbs and looking for NATO to bomb Milosevic for them” 
(Alistair Campbell, Tony Blair’s former head of communications, in A. Campbell, The Blair Years). 
 
85   Müllerson, R., “Precedents in the Mountains: On the Parallels and Uniqueness of the Cases of Kosovo, 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia“, in Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 8, no. 1., 2009,  p. 9. 
 
86   Shaw, M. N. op. cit., p. 523. 
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“ceased to exist” and fully-recognised successor states
87
 were determined.  
The dissolution of Yugoslavia was a substantial formal act which enabled 
the birth of several successor states. Therefore, there was no subject 
known as a parent state, whose consent would legalise the secession, 
unlike the case of Kosovo, where the subject of parent state is apparent. 
The absence of Serbia’s consent regarding Kosovo is a crucial factor 
against the legality of the Statehood of Kosovo, as the form of expression 
of the principle of territorial integrity. Eventual recognition of Kosovo by 
Serbia would definitely be a step toward the legality of a Kosovo 
Statehood; although that is rather unlikely, at least in the near future.  
To declare the Statehood of Kosovo legitimate, there need to be 
other criteria to clarify the legality of the Statehood. The most applicable 
formal way of constituting legality may be the doctrine of extreme human 
rights violations and the internal unstable situation recognised by a 
substantial number of states. However, owing to the ambiguity of these 
claims, they are incapable of constructing a stable legal argument.   
The main question of this topic is whether the creation of a State of 
Kosovo, with regard to secession of a minority, constitutes a precedent for 
other minorities seeking independence, or if it is a case of sui generis not 
                                                
87   Successor states: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. 
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suitable for any other case of secession. This is the area where the politics 
overwhelm the objective legal reasoning in an obvious way.  
The Western states declared that the process of secession of Kosovo 
is sui generis as a consequence of taking certain features together, which 
separately do not make the concept specific. It is argued that the aspects of 
the NATO humanitarian intervention taken together with the subsequent 
implementation of the long-lasting UN administration of the territory and 
the human rights violation make the situation in Kosovo specific and not 
suitable to any other secessionist claim.  
Indeed, in announcing the recognition of Kosovo by the USA, 
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice explained:  
 
The unusual combination of factors found in the Kosovo 
situation -  including the context of Yugoslavia’s break-up, the 
history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against civilians in 
Kosovo, and the extended period of UN administration - are not 
found elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo a special case. 
Kosovo cannot be seen as precedent for any other situation in the 
world today.
88
  
                                                
88
   However, contrary to this claim, is the statement of Russian Duma: “The right of nations to self-
determination cannot justify recognition of Kosovo’s independence along with the simultaneous 
55 
 
 
This legal reasoning is not relevant. Taking into account the essential 
purpose of humanitarian intervention, limited to fighting against a human 
rights violation, it is considered as a means to essentially “stop and reverse 
ethnic cleansing”. Therefore, it might be argued that under these 
circumstances the essential purpose of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention has been misused as a supportive argument to the claim of 
independence of a secessionist province. Subsequently, it discredits the 
concept of the fight for human rights protection and effectively ends up as 
an “intervention for the claim of independence of secessionists”. 
Humanitarian intervention must not go beyond the humanitarian 
purposes.
89
 Neither the UNMIK nor NATO presence has been, in legal 
terms, designed as a preparatory to, or as legitimising the independence of, 
the province, and there is no such provision for a post-intervention factual 
situation as the basis for the new legal position.
90
 Therefore, this argument 
should not be used as a cause for the sui generis concept. Hence, it may be 
assumed that it is more reasonable to expect initiation of such an 
                                                                                                                                                     
refusal to discuss similar acts by other self-proclaimed states, which have obtained de facto independence 
exclusively by themselves” (Borgen, op. cit., p. 4). 
 
89   Müllerson, op. cit., p.7. 
 
90 Orakhelashvili, A., “The Kosovo UDI between Agreed Law and Subjective Perception: A Response to 
Hilpold”, in Chinese Journal of International Law (2009), vol. 8, no.2,  p.289. 
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intervention by other violent secessionist parties, with the same subsequent 
normative consequences.
91
 
 According to this analysis, Kosovo is unique; in simple terms, it is 
not identical to other cases, but it is definitely similar in essence to other 
cases since it involves the “struggle of a minority ethnic group for 
independent Statehood without the consent of the parent state”.
92
 Hence, 
any principle beyond the general framework of international law guiding 
to the solution of Kosovo will “affect all essentially similar cases around 
the globe.”
93
 In keeping with the definition of precedent, it is “judgment or 
decision used as an authority for reaching the same decision in subsequent 
cases.”
94
 The subsequent cases are bound merely by the main principles of 
the judgment (ratio decidendi) and not by the passing comments (obiter 
dictum). Accordingly, if it is not a precedent, no subsequent case should be 
of such a nature to justify implementation of the already adjudicated 
case.
95
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We can already see the indirect effect of the Kosovo solution, not yet 
in a legal context, but clearly in terms of the intensification of the claims 
of other separatist attempts and political rhetoric of their representatives. 
An example is not difficult to find: Russia in relation to last year’s conflict 
in Georgia, where the Kosovo argument was apparently misused in order 
to recognise the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Even 
though Russia has not been followed by the international community, the 
Kosovo case has been unarguably used as a pattern in dealing with 
secessionists and as an instrument to pursue geo-political interests of 
Russia in Caucasus. 
This leads to highly legally vague reflection: Kosovo shall be sui 
generis on the basis of the right to external self-determination under the 
human rights regime and extraordinary and specifically defined 
circumstances
96
 constructed under joint matters of the NATO action and 
the UNMIK presence, and the use of force by the central government. This 
analysis is obviously insufficient to build up a stable legal justification.   
In order to legitimise the implementation of the final Settlement for 
Kosovo, it cannot be modelled simply on principles of international law 
and at the same time not constituting a precedent. Hence, it is argued that 
                                                
96    Term used according to the statement of the Supreme Court of Canada in Quebec case. 
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there are incorporated aspects of political pragmatism in the legal 
consideration in order to achieve the particular goal.
97
 Consequently, this 
fact drew denial of any purely legal orders in this context. In this context, 
by pragmatism, we mean a solution – reasonably applicable in reality – to 
reach the current political and economic goals, by using means beyond the 
doctrines of international law.
98
 If it is claimed that the secession of 
Kosovo is sui generis, it is argued that it still constitutes a precedent, but in 
terms of utilising pragmatism within legal-reasoning, otherwise the 
secession of Kosovo established a clear precedent for other secessionists. 
In this sense we might be able to expect a shift in legal interpretation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Kosovo today, two years after declared independence, exists in the 
same form as during the time of the declaration. It is formed in consistence 
with the concept of “supervised independence” intending to create an 
international society with no alien domination and with high-level 
minority rights, to stabilise the living standards under international police 
                                                
97  Regarding the uniqueness of Kosovo, see Professor Oliver Corten, http://de-construct.net/e-zine/?p=2854 
(20.9.2009). 
 
98   This assertion is basically proved by the claim of not overlooking the status quo of Kosovo and the need for 
not keeping it as frozen conflict as, e.g., Cyprus or Sudan. 
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forces, to reach optimal self-governance and to include Kosovo within the 
world community of states, which by itself is not an illegitimate or 
illogical perception.  
Even so, the current situation in Kosovo, under the administration of 
EULEX, still has not improved much in terms of keeping down the 
extreme level of unemployment, poverty and organised crime
99
. It may be 
stated, however, that the proclaimed independence diffuses positive energy 
among Kosovo Albanians, and slowly but surely the level of ethnic 
violence in the region is decreasing. The issue of Kosovo still remains 
significant in Serbian politics. However, it may be said that the Serbian 
leaders no longer observe Kosovo as the absolute priority of Serbian 
politics. Naturally, the political situation does not allow Serbians to 
recognise the State of Kosovo and it is unlikely they ever will, as we could 
see according to the recent summit in Slovenia. As time passes, we might 
see that the priorities will shift slightly to other important issues, such as 
integration into the EU and economic problems, instead of blocking 
diplomatic progress.   
Law does not operate in isolation from reality. Particularly, 
international law is not taken out of political engagement, as international 
                                                
99http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/articles/2009/05/18/reportage-01 
(23.3.2010). 
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law is not created by one lawful authority as in national circumstances, but 
by the conduct of two or more states focussing primarily on their own 
related positions.  The purpose of law is to reflect the reality in order to 
effectively regulate the conduct of members of a society. Therefore, in 
order to avoid chaos in a society and the law of the jungle, the principles 
of law should be obeyed. In this particular case the international 
community undeniably seeks a reasonable Settlement, which is sustainable 
and capable of achieving regional stability and a background for future 
economic prosperity, although at the price of bending the legal principles 
and losing the autonomy of international law. Political or ideological 
benefits obtained by those who violate policies in one case could be 
neutralised or even out-weighed afterwards. This is where the significance 
of observing autonomous principles becomes most obvious. Otherwise law 
just reflects the conduct of states with no regard to any principles.    
In these circumstances it needs to be decided whether to commit to 
international norms in order to support the authority of law in all 
circumstances with the intention not to destabilise the international system, 
although it might not produce a practical settlement of the question in the 
short term; or whether to give priority to the current stability and economic 
prosperity of a particular region at the expense of potentially jeopardising 
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other places around the world in a long-term perspective and weakening 
the authority of international law in general.  
Legal reasoning demands the long-term perspective, rather than 
current suitability. The international community of states has answered 
with a division and Kosovo now finds itself in a legal limbo which, for 
Kosovo Albanians, is still better than being in state with Serbia. What is 
better for some is worse for the others, though, not only in the context of 
Serbs in Kosovo, but also for other entities involved in similar conflicts 
around the world.   
Further political actions, as for example recognition by Serbia, might 
be a solution for this situation. The pending ICJ decision will perhaps shed 
more light on the dispute and clarify the doctrine of secession. 
Nonetheless, the current situation in spite of all its problems can be 
described practically in the words of Mr. Eduard Kukan
100
: “If Kosovo 
remains as it is, it will be recognised by all sooner or later.”  
 The position of international law represents the conservative 
perspective and therefore is hostile to the right of secession of minorities. 
Nevertheless, this dispute is of substantial political importance. It seems a 
new concept has been implemented into the relationship between politics 
                                                
100   Member of European Parliament, Chairman of the European Parliament Delegation for relations with 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Slovak Republic in interview in the European Parliament 23.3.2010. 
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and international law, of implementing political pragmatism above the 
general doctrines of law into legal reasoning. Therefore, in the context of a 
lack of clarity in international law and the complexities of the politics, it 
must be concluded that Kosovo has not established its claim to legal 
Statehood, and as a result, a creation of such a state has set a precedent in 
international relations. 
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